Abstract: Standards play a vital role in promoting food safety. Certification bodies audit manufacturing sites to certify them for a standard. Using data from the British Retail Consortium global standards program, we offer a glimpse at the market for and examine manufacturers' choices of certification bodies. Manufacturers prefer geographically close certifiers and those that assigned a higher share of A grades in the previous months. This behavior might provide an incentive for less stringent audits. We also find a strong tendency of manufacturers to return to the same certification body that audited their site in the previous year.
Introduction
In many markets buyers cannot easily find out the quality of goods. Public programs and market mechanisms have evolved to alleviate the inefficiencies associated with uncertainty and asymmetric information related to product quality. In some industries, standards programs set minimal quality requirements, and intermediaries (certification bodies, certifiers) audit firms to determine if they comply with the requirement of a standard. A growing economics literature theoretically studies the role of intermediaries, and their strategies.
1 However, empirical evidence on markets for certification bodies is scarce.
Standards programs and certification bodies play an important role in the food industry, where food safety and attributes such as organic production or non-genetically modified ingredients are not easily observed. Food producers in the United States and around the world increasingly count on third party certification bodies to verify and disclose that they meet the requirements of food safety standards. 2 Certification may help producers reduce risk and liability, improve market access, and gain a competitive advantage (Tanner, 2000) . 3 Faced with an increasing number of food recalls, many food retailers (e.g., Wal-Mart, Target) now demand that their suppliers obtain food safety certification for certain standards (Crandall et al., 2012) . Government agencies have also adopted food safety certification procedures. For example, in 2015, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) introduced the requirement of a credible food safety certification on high-risk imported foods. 4 While the popularity and prominence of food safety certification has grown substantially over time, little economic research has been conducted on these markets, and no empirical study has examined the determinants of producers' choices of certification bodies. In this article we empirically study the market for certification bodies for the British Retail Consortium (BRC) global standards program, a leading international food safety standard.
We examine the market for BRC certifiers and identify key factors that affect producers' choices of third party certification bodies for a food safety standard. In 2015 there were 17 certification bodies, the largest four serving about 70% of all sites. We map the location of certification bodies and sites, and show that manufacturing sites prefer geographically close certification bodies. This could be explained by the fact that manufacturing sites cover the travel costs of their auditor(s) or that manufacturers are simply more likely to find a certification body that is nearby. The importance of geographic location creates some degree of horizontal product differentiation in the market for certification bodies.
A central issue in the economics of certification is the potential for biased quality reports. Certification bodies compete for producers who pay for certification, and this introduces a potential conflict of interest which can result in biased quality reports (Dranove and Jin, 2010) . The BRC program assigns manufacturing sites grades based on initial auditor findings of disconformities--i.e., issues that need to be fixed. Passing grades are A, B or C. The BRC requires that manufacturing sites fix these disconformities before being certified. Audit grades are posted online and can be observed by buyers.
Manufacturers are thus expected to prefer obtaining higher audit grades so as to give a signal of high quality to buyers, and to minimize the cost of fixing disconformities. A grade of C also requires that the next audit be performed within 6 months instead of 12 months.
We provide evidence consistent with manufacturers being attracted to perceived leniently grading certification bodies. This suggests that certification bodies have an incentive to assign more high (A) grades.
Consumers' are often observed to repeatedly buy the same product. The marketing literature sometimes attributes such behavior to consumers' brand loyalty (see Jacoby and Kyner, 1973) . Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010) examined different explanations for consumers' observed inertia using data on purchases of orange juice and margarine.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) studied a status quo bias. In the context of certification, we show that manufacturing sites have a strong tendency to return to the same certification body. This could arise due to switching costs. A manufacturing site may become familiar with the certification body and how it operates, or form personal relationships with certification body personnel.
Finally, we consider a number of additional factors that affect the choice of certification bodies, including performance ratings of certification bodies, and their offering of certification for other types of standards. We also investigate how small-scale producers differ from larger producers in the choice of certification bodies and in audit grades.
Our dataset contains information about BRC certified manufacturing sites and their choice of certification bodies between 2011 and 2015. We matched these data with data we collected on all BRC-accredited certification bodies in the U.S. We primarily use a conditional logit model to identify the factors that affect the choice of certification bodies.
In order to allow for heterogeneity in manufacturing sites, we also employ a mixed logit specification (Train, 2009) . Our data contains the addresses of manufacturing sites and of certification bodies, which allows us to find the distances between them. We proxy for perceived audit leniency by the share of A grades assigned by the certification body in a four-month period prior to a manufacturer's certification. Since sites need to be audited each year, we observe repeated choices of certification bodies for most of the manufacturing sites in our data. This allows us to test their tendency to return to the same certification body.
Our study contributes to the literature on certification. Theoretical literature has studied certifiers' incentives for audit intensity and information disclosure as well as other strategic considerations. Farhi et al. (2010) found that the accuracy of an audit depends on whether certifiers opt for a quick turnaround, and Jahn et al. (2005) argued that it depends on the cost of the audit, which likely increases with the auditing quality. Lizzeri (1999) offered an adverse selection model of certification and studies how intermediaries' incentives for information disclosure depend on market structure. Albano and Lizzeri (2001) examined the role of intermediaries when there is information asymmetry and endogenous choice of quality. Our empirical study offers a first look at the market structure of BRC certification bodies, and at the audit grades they assign.
There is only a small number of empirical studies related to food safety certification.
5 Anders et al. (2007) used data from the EurepGAP standard and showed that later entry into the system entails higher competitive pressure (as measured by the number of competing certification bodies). In 2011, the FDA performed an assessment of third party certification bodies for aquacultured shrimp and found " [w] ide variation in [certification body] CB auditor performance across CBs." Differences in audit quality between certification bodies provide producers with an incentive to choose certification bodies that they perceive to be more lenient. In this article, we find empirical evidence that producers are more likely to choose certification bodies that assign a high share of A grades in a period of time before the site's audit. Our finding suggests that competing certification bodies could have an incentive to grade more leniently. For example, Foster and Guttierez (2013) analyzed the clean industry program in Mexico. 6 In the context of higher education, Bar, Kadiyali and Zussman (2010) showed that students are attracted to leniently graded courses.
Other studies provide qualitative discussions and insights about food safety certification. Henson and Caswell (1999) 
U.S. Food Safety Certification and the BRC Standards Program
There are four types of key players in food safety certification: accreditation bodies, certification bodies (CBs), producers, and buyers -all centering around various food safety standards. The ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board (ANAB) is the U.S. accreditation body that oversees conformity assessment and accredits certification bodies in food safety.
Third party certification bodies are firms that offer independent verification that the producer meets the requirements of a certain standard. This rating, posted on the BRC's web site for public viewing, measures the certification body's overall management of BRC certification.
Manufacturers that decide to obtain BRC certification might start with a selfassessment or a pre-assessment conducted by an advisor or auditor to determine what changes would need to be made to comply with the standard. If a manufacturer decides to continue with certification, they choose a certification body and set an audit date.
According to the BRC web site, audits usually last 2 days, but this duration may vary depending on various factors such as the number of products and the size of the site.
The cost of certification is determined case by case. The BRC program charges a fee (currently £185), and also sets rules for how to determine the length of the audit (largely determined by the manufacturer's size and its existing food safety management system) which influences its cost. The rest of the audit costs are set by the independent certification bodies and also depend on the length of the audit. Additionally, the manufacturer needs to cover the auditor's cost of travel and stay. Working with a certification body that is geographically close can therefore lower certification costs for the manufacturer. A representative of one of the certification bodies we contacted for this study indicated that, Presumably, sites with lower grades needed to incur a higher cost in order to fix all disconformities so that they could obtain certification. Additionally, higher grades probably signal to buyers a higher degree of safety or quality. All audit grades are reported in the BRC directory and can be publically viewed, except for the grades of a small proportion of producers who opted to keep their certification information private. owner (which allows us to distinguish sites owned by a larger manufacturer that certifies multiple sites), and the certification body. 12 We also have the evaluation start date, certification issue date and expiry date.
As indicated in table 1, three other food safety standards programs provide audit grades as well: PrimusGFS, SQF, and IFS. However, PrimusGFS does not publicly disclose grades, SQF does not disclose certification bodies of certified sites, and IFS does not make their list of certified sites publicly available. We chose to study the BRC standards 11 The month of November simply happened to be the month in which the BRC program extracted the data for us. We received the 2011 data at an earlier date which is why it was extracted for a different month.
This means that we are missing sites that had expiry dates between May 2012 (not included in the 2011 date since it was extracted for April) and November 2012 (at which time the 2012 data starts. Excluding 2011 data (data before the gap), does not change our results qualitatively.
12 Audit owners were provided only in the 2014 and 2015 data. For earlier years we impute audit owners using site names and audit owners in the later years.
program because it does not suffer from any of the above drawbacks, allowing us (and any producer) to observe the choice of certification body and grade of each site.
We merged the site level observations with data we collected from the web site of each of the certification bodies in the choice set. Table 2 reports summary statistics of the variables at site level and certification body level. We used SAS function (zipcitydistance) and the addresses in our dataset, to obtain the geodetic distance in miles between manufacturing site and certification body pairs. We define the distance as the distance between a site and the nearest branch or headquarter for a certification body. The average distance in our sample is 610 miles. Each site has an audit grade. Overall, 85% of passing grades were As, 14.2% were Bs, and the overall share of C grades was less than 1%.
13
Some of the sites in our data have the same owner for more than one site. Companies like
Tyson Foods or Archer Daniels Midland have multiple manufacturing sites that obtain BRC certification in the same year. We classified these as "multisites" sites that belong to the same owner as at least one other site. Multisites are likely part of a large scale company, and often but not necessarily choose the same certification body. The share of multisites in our data is 69%. We refer to all other sites as "single sites". We used the FDA's Archive for Recalls, Market Withdrawals & Safety Alerts to collect data on food safety recalls.
14 The variable recall takes the value 1 if the site's parent company had a recall in the 13 Our A grades category includes a small number of AA grades which were only introduced in 2015, and a small number of A+ grades indicating that the site opted for an unannounced audit.
14 Available at the FDA website: http://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls/archiverecalls/default.htm corresponding year. Only 1% of the sites in our data had a parent company that had a food safety recall.
Our main variable of interest is the share of A grades the certification body assigns during the four months' period prior to a site's certification date. We interpret this share as a measure of perceived audit leniency of certification bodies. The average measure of perceived leniency is 86%. We also found data regarding other standards offered by specific certification bodies, their age, and revenue.
[Insert Table 3 Panel A shows the number of certified sites for each certification body, for each year. As can be seen in this table, 12 of the certification bodies audited sites every year and 6 more were active in some but not all of the years. In some years, certain certification bodies had very few sites. For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we dropped certification bodies that certified less than 5 manufacturing sites in the current or lagged year as well as the sites that selected them. The combined share of sites we dropped is less than 1%. Dropping choices with lack of observations is a common practice in many empirical choice modelling studies (e.g., Guadagni and Little, 1983; Ching et al., 2009) . Table 3 also displays measures of market concentration. The sum of the market shares of the largest four certification bodies in each year is indicated by I4. The I4 concentration index was 80% in 2011, and declined to about 72% in later years. We also show the Herfindhal Hirschman index (HHI) of market concentration (see Hirschman, 1964 ). The index exceeds 1,500 in each year, suggesting that this is a moderately concentrated market according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010). (table 4) , a year in which we also see a significant increase in sites. In table 5 we see however that the sites that newly obtained BRC certification that year had a lower average grade than those that were certified previously. This suggests that the increase in grade was not driven by entry of high quality sites.
[Insert table 5]
With the data that is available to us, we focus on investigating the choice of certification bodies made by BRC certified manufacturing sites. Presumably, manufacturing sites make a choice of which standard to adopt before choosing a certification body for that standard. Since we do not have data that would allow us to examine the choice of standard, our analysis is thus conditional on the choice of BRC certification.
Empirical Evidence
To establish which factors affect food manufacturers' choice of certification bodies, we We use the following empirical model where the utility of choice j to site i in year t is a function of the distance between the site and the certification body, the certification body's share of A grades in a period (four months) preceding the certification date, the site's choice of certification body in the previous year, and a vector of other certification body characteristics
Denoting the number of certification bodies in year t as Nt, we write the probability of site i choosing certification body j in period t as
Since the auditor's travel cost is paid by the manufacturer, we expect manufacturers to prefer certification bodies that are closer to the location of the site ( 1 <0). We also expect manufacturers to prefer certification bodies that they perceive would be more likely to assign them a higher audit grade ( 2 >0). A higher audit grade means that the auditor identified less numerous or less severe disconformities, meaning that the manufacturer would need to spend less on correcting these issues before obtaining certification. The audit grade appears at the center of a BRC food safety certificate. Higher audit grades likely also serve as a signal of safety and compliance with the standard requirements for buyers. When certification bodies vary in their share of A grades, manufacturers that are not sure if they comply with all the requirements of the standard might also anticipate a higher probability of passing when selecting a certification body with a high share of As.
Food manufacturers need to renew their certification every year, and each year they again face a choice between a number of accredited certification bodies. After working with a certification body one year, the manufacturer might develop a preference for this choice for a number of reasons, such as a status quo bias and switching costs. We expect that certification bodies prefer to return to the same certification body that certified them in the previous year to. This tendency to repeatedly interact with the same certification body would be captured with 3 >0. Table 6 displays the results of our conditional logit regression estimation. In column
(1) we present a base specification that includes our three main variables of interest (distance, share of A grades, and certification body chosen last year) and no additional controls. As we expected, the distance between the certification body and the manufacturing site has a negative effect on the choice of the certification body, which is likely because the travel costs of the auditor are incurred by the manufacturer. The share of A grades that the certification body assigned in the previous year has a positive effect on the probability that a certification body is chosen and so does the indicator for certification body chosen in the previous year. In column (2) we added six product category indicators. These product categories as defined by the BRC food standard are: raw products of animal or vegetable origin; fruit, vegetables, and nuts; processed foods and liquids with pasteurization; processed foods ready to eat or heat; ambient stable products with pasteurization; and ambient stable products not involving sterilizations. The inclusion of product category indicators accounts for unobserved site preferences for certain certification body due to their being well known or specialized in a certain product category (e.g., one certification body is specialized in bakery). We also include a control for whether the site's parent company had an FDA food safety recall in the same year, which intends to control for site-specific food safety quality. Since in column (2) we added manufacturing site characteristics that do not vary by certification bodies, these enter as interaction terms with each certification body choice. The long list of interactions is suppressed from the table. In column (3) we cluster standard errors at the site level. Our findings of a negative effect of distance, and a positive effect of share A grades and certification body chosen last year remain.
In column (4) of table 6 we add certification body level controls. The direction of effects of our main variables of interest remains unchanged. The number of other manufacturing food safety standards (i.e. competing standards) that the certification body offers, has a positive effect on the probability this certification body is chosen, offering USDA National Organic Program Standard has a negative effect, and offering of GlobalGAP -a farming standard, has an insignificant effect on the probability that the certification body is selected for BRC certification. Certification body revenues and age have insignificant coefficients.
To further investigate whether the extent to which manufacturers' tendency to remain with the same certification body depends on the grade obtained with this certification body in the previous year, in column (5) we include the three grade-specific variables capturing certification body chosen last year interacted each grade category (defined in equation (2)). All three indicators have positive and significant coefficients.
The coefficient is highest if the certification body had assigned an A grade in the previous period, and lowest if the certification body had assigned a C grade in the previous year.
The difference is only significant at the 10% level for the coefficients of A grade and B grade, which seems to suggest a strong tendency to remain with the same certification body that is only slightly affected by grade. This likely makes entry into the certification body market difficult.
A higher share of A grades assigned by a certification body could (other than less stringent audits) also result from a particular certification body being attractive to high quality manufacturing sites. Estimating the model with certification body fixed effects will capture unobserved characteristics that might be attractive to high quality manufacturers.
In the last column of table 6, we present estimates of the model including certification body fixed effects. This controls for time-invariant unobserved certifier quality. Identification of the effect of the share of A grades in this model comes from variation in the share of A grades over time. In this model too, we see that manufacturers are more likely to choose a certification body when it had a higher share of A grades in the months before they were audited. This effect is significant at the 1% level. We also still find a strong positive effect of certification body chosen in the previous year. The effect of distance however vanishes.
[Insert table 6]
In table A1 in the Appendix we illustrate marginal effects for a change in a certification body's distance from site, or share of As, and certification body chosen last year on the same certification body's probability of selection, for the leading certification bodies. The specification is based on column (4) of table 6. The highest probability of selection was 0.3. An increase of 100 miles in the distance of a site to this certification body would lower its probability of selection by 0.004, which is a 1.3% decrease in
probability. An increase from 0 to 1 in the share of A grades would increase the probability of selection by 0.41. For the certification with highest demand, the marginal effect of certification body chosen last year is 0.81, which means that the probability that a site that chose this certification body last year chooses it again is 0.81 higher than for a site that did not chose this certification body the previous year.
Subsample Analyses
In table 7, we present analyses using different sub-samples of our data. The BRC provides a performance rating of BRC accredited certification bodies. This rating captures aspects of the performance of certification bodies such as compliance with audit protocols, quality of reports and the speed of uploading audit data. The BRC updates this rating of certification bodies every six months on its web site, but in our data we only have the ratings that were available in March 2015. Therefore, the model that includes a BRC rating is restricted to the sub-sample that only includes the 2015 data. If the BRC rating is a signal of an efficient certification body that provides reports in a timely manner, we would expect a positive effect of excellent rating. Alternatively, one could also think that sites might interpret high ratings as indicative of rigorous auditing and thus the assigning of lower grades. However, the data does not support such an interpretation. The mean share of A grades conditional on a rating of 3, 4 or 5 is about 91%, 86% and 91% respectively, based on the 2015 data. We estimate the effect of certification rating on manufacturing site choice of certification bodies by including a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the certification body had excellent BRC performance ratings. We present these results in column (1) of table 7, in which only the 2015 data was utilized. We found that the effect of an excellent BRC performance rating is positive but insignificant.
In columns (2) and (3) distance has a negative effect on selection for multisites, but this effect is insignificant in the singe sites sample. The share of A grades and certification body chosen last year increase the probability of selection in both sub-samples. In column (4), we also considered sites that were certifying for the first time. Obviously these observations do not have a certification body chosen last year. 16 Distance has a negative effect but the share of A grades effect, though remains positive, is insignificant for first-time sites. It is possible that first-time sites are less informed and thus do not respond to higher shares of A grades.
[Insert 
Robustness
In table A2 in the Appendix we show results of robustness check for the share of A grades variable definition. We estimate the models of columns (4) and (6) of table 6 with two alternative definitions of our share of A grades variable. We replace the share of A grades in the 120 days prior to the sites audit with 90 days for columns (1) and (2) and with 180 days for the last two columns in table A2. The effect of certification body chosen last year remains positive and highly significant across all specifications. Using certification body fixed effects generally results in an insignificant distance effect, likely because distance does not vary over years. The effect of the share of A grades remains positive in all specifications; it is significant at the 5% level except in the fixed effects specification using 90 days.
[Insert table A2]

A Mixed Logit Approach
In this subsection we estimate a mixed logit model of manufacturing sites' choices of certification bodies. The utility of each manufacturing site takes the form (1), but this model allows for the coefficients i associated with distance, perceived lenience (share of A grades) and the tendency to return to the same certification body (certification body chosen last year) to be random-coefficients with normally distributed error terms that vary over manufacturing sites. This method is applied to anglers' choice of fishing sites in Train (2009). Table 8 [Insert 
Concluding Remarks
In this article we study manufacturing sites' choices of certification bodies for the BRC food safety standard. Estimating a conditional logit model we find a negative and statistically significant effect of certification body distance from the manufacturing site on the probability that the certification body is chosen. Since, as we have seen in figure 2, certification bodies are not uniformly geographically distributed, this finding suggests that producers in some area of the country, especially in the center states, could be disadvantaged in their need to choose certification bodies that are further away. We observed that small scale producers are audited by certification bodies that are located further away. Since geographic location does matter, location creates a degree of product differentiation which likely creates some market power.
We find a positive and significant effect of the share of A grades assigned by a certification body in a period preceding the site's specification on the probability that a certification body is chosen. A limitation of our study is that we are unable to tell if a high share of a grades given by a certification body results from its more lenient audit practices or because this certification body was selected by a larger share of sites that deserve a high audit grade. Either way, disparities in perceived leniency can affect the choice of certification bodies. Additionally, our finding that manufacturers prefer certification bodies that assign more lenient grades suggests that certification bodies likely experience some competitive pressure to raise audit grades.
The market for certification bodies is moderately concentrated, the number of certifiers remained more or less stable in the past three years, and the largest four certification bodies serve about 72% of the manufacturing sites. Our analysis shows that manufacturers tend to stick to the same certification body that certified their site in the previous year. This could make it difficult for new certification bodies to gain market share.
Manufacturing site tendency to interact repeatedly with the same certification body they used in the previous year thus creates a barrier to entry.
Our analysis in this article simplified the complex nature of the market for BRC certification bodies in a number of important ways. Primarily, we focused on manufacturing sites' choices of certification bodies and did not directly examine certification bodies' strategic behavior. We hope that this analysis contributes to the understanding of some empirical facts within this important, unusual, and unfamiliar industry. We believe it shows the potential for pressure to grant high ratings, which has so far mainly been discussed in theoretical frameworks. Notes: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Notes: The model is estimated using repeating sites, so we can observe the sites certification body choice and grade in the previous year. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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